- What if you were told convincingly that nothing is immoral?
- Would your behavior change?
- If so, how would it change?
- Ethics: “murder is bad”
- Meta-ethics: “murder is bad because…”
- It’s possible for people to agree on points of ethics while being in strong disagreement on points of metaethics
- In order to make philosophical progress, you need to be able to change your metaethics without losing your sense of ethics entirely
- To allow yourself to change metaethics, it’s useful to set up lines of retreat that allow you to change your meta-ethics without immediately affecting your sense of ethics
- Lines of possible retreat:
- The Moral Void - if your metaethics tells you that some part of your ethics is wrong, you can allow your ethics to override your sense of meta-ethics
- Lines of retreat for naturalistic meta-ethics:
- Why is meta-ethics important
- People think that rationality drains the meaning and wonder out of the universe
- Having a false understanding of where ethics comes from causes distress
- Can you trust any of your moral instincts?
- Your belief that you have no information about morality is not internally consistent
- If you can’t come up with a procedure to define morality, how can you program an AI to decide morality?
- If you discard everything evolution has to say about morality, you discard yourself; every part of you (including the parts of your brain that think about morality) is a product of evolution
- You should take your initial notion of morality as a starting position
- Morality is a product of reason; it doesn’t come from some light shining from beyond
- If you tell an all powerful AI to give you what you want, the AI will modify you to want something cheap, and then give you that
- The problem is that we don’t have enough insight into our own psychology and neurology to fully know and describe why we want what we want
- This situation analogizes to moral philosophy if you replace the question of “What do I want?” with “What is right?”
- The notion of “right” is a fixed question/fixed framework
- Morality isn’t tautologically defined by what you want
- Instead what you want and what is moral are both linked to some underlying value system
- If the AI changes what you desire, that underlying value system doesn’t change, and so what is moral doesn’t change
- Note: I was confused by this article, so I apologize in advance if I misinterpreted Eliezer or oversimplified his argument
- The normal formulation of a Prisoner’s Dilemma involves two humans and a symmetric payoff matrix
- The problem with this formulation is that it triggers humans’ natural empathy for one another
- No human can pretend that they’re perfectly selfish, so we instinctively start hunting for way to make a cooperate-cooperate outcome happen
- To get a true sense of a prisoners’ dilemma, we need to be in a situation where we’re instinctively looking for ways to trick the other side into cooperating while we defect
- There has to be a moral justification for defection in order for us to truly feel the conflict inherent in the prisoners’ dilemma